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444 WALSH V. WALSH. [18 C. (2d) 
App. 378, 386, 387 [9 Pac. (2d) 225], as follows: "It is a 
settled rule that when the language employed is fairly sus-
ceptible of either one of two constructions contended for 
without doing violence to its usual and ordinary import an 
ambiguity arises where extrinsic evidence may be resorted to 
for the purpose of explaining the intention of the parties, and 
that for this purpose conversations Q,etween and declarations 
of the parties during the negotiations at and before the execu-
tion of the contract may be shown (Balfour v. Fresno O. & 1. 
00., 109 Cal. 221 [41 Pac. 876]). n [5] And in Scott v. 
Sun-Maid Raisin Growers Assn., 13 Cal. App. (2d) 353 [57 
Pac. (2d) 148], the court stated at p. 359: "When the mean-
ing of the language of a contract is uncertain or doubtful and 
parol evidence is introduced in aid of its interpretation, the 
question of its meaning is one of fact . ... (Thomson v. Leak, 
135 Cal. App. 544, 548 [27 Pac. (2d) 795] ; Gallatin v. Marko-
witz, 139 Cal. App. 10, 13 [33 Pac. (2d) 424]; Ooats v. Gen-
eral Motors Gorp., 3 Cal. App. (2d) 340, 356 [39 Pac. (2d) 
838].) " [Italics added.] 
[2b] Applying the rules of law above stated, it is clear 
that the trial court should have denied defendant's motion for 
a summary judgment so that the issue raised between the 
parties hereto as to the duration of defendant's undertaking 
to furnish support and maintenance to the plaintiff might be 
tried upon its merits. [6] The summary judgment statute is 
drastic and its purpose is not to provide a substitute for exist-
ing methods in the trial of issues of fact. The use made of 
the statute in this case was a perversion and an abuse of it. 
For the reasons indicated. the judgment 'of the superior 
court is hereby reversed and the cause remanded. 
Gibson, C .. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Tray-
nor, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied Septem-
ber 13, 194L 
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[L. A. No. 16881. In Bank.-Aug. 19, 1941.] 
A.L. KEENER, Appellant, v. NELLIE D. KEENER, 
Respondent. 
[1] Divorce-Extreme Cruelty-Conduct Causing Mental Suffer-
ing.~The inflicting of "grievous mental suffering," within the 
meaning of Civ. Code, § 94, is a question of fact to be deduced 
from the circumstances of the case, in the light of the intelli-
gence, refinement and dellcacy of sentiment of the complaining 
party. A correct decision depends upon the sound sense and 
judgment of the trial court whose conclusion will not be 
disturbed unless the evidence is so slight as to indicate an 
abuse of discretion. 
[2] Id.-Extreme Cruelty-Conduct Causing Mental Suffering-
Conduct Indicating Dissatisfaction.~A course of conduct by 
which one party to a marriage continually indicates dissatis-
faction with the other and makes such dissatisfaction known 
to friends of the parties may well cause humiliation, em-
barrassment and mental anguish to a degree constituting ex-
treme cruelty. And so a spouse's loss of temper, his repeated 
criticism of his wife in the presence of friends, his statements, 
after years of marriage, that she should support' herself are 
sufficient to constitute extreme cruelty wher~ they are proved 
to have caused her grievous mental suffering, 
[3] Id.-Proceedings-Complaint-Pleading Cruelty.-While Civ. 
Code, § 94, defining extreme cruelty requires an element of 
wrongfulness, a pleader suing for divorce on such ground need 
not use the exact language of the statute. It is' sufficient if 
the rational inference from the allegation is that the inflic-
tion .of the suffering on the other party was wrongful. 
[4] Id.-Extreme Cruelty-Justification-Proof by Complainant. 
It is not necessary that a cross-complainant seeking a divorce 
on the ground of extreme cruelty establish as a part of her 
case her ,own freedom. from fault where the plaintiff in his 
answer to the cross-complaint did not allege any fault on her 
part, and there was no evidence at the trial indicating that 
2. See 9 C~l. Jur. 650; 17 Am. Jur. 188. 
McK. Dig. References: 1, 2. Divorce and Separation,§ 13; 3, 5. 
Divorce and Separation, § 72 (3) ; 4. Divorce and Separation, § 23; 
6. Divorce and Separation, § 25 i 7. Divorce and Separation, § 27; 
8. Trial, § 285. 
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the cross-complainant was in any way responsible for the 
plaintiff's course of conduct. 
[5] Id. - Proceedings - Complaint - Pleading Oruelty-Alleging 
Time and Place.-A pleader seeking a divorce on the ground 
of extreme cruelty need not, in the ,absence of special de-
murrer, plead the exact time and place of each of the acts 
complained of where the conduct was continuous and was 
not confined to any particular time or locality. 
[6] Id.-Extreme Oruelty-Sufficiency of Evidence-Motive.-One 
seeking a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty need not 
prove that the course of conduct complained of was inspired 
by malevolent motives. 
[7] Id. -Extreme Oruelty - Corroboration - Successive Acts.-
Where· the cruelty consists of successive acts of ill treatment, 
it is not necessary that there be direct testimony of other 
witnesses to every act sworn to by the complaining party. 
The corroboration is sufficient where the corroborating wit-
ness states that he heard the testimony of the party and 
knows the facts related therein to be· true. . 
[8] Trial- Findings-Necessity for-Waiver.-Findings of fact 
are not required where the. parties join in a written stipula-
tion, filed with the clerk, waiving findings. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 1.108 
Angeles County. Ben B. Lindsey, JUdge. Affirmed. 
Action for divorce in which defendant filed a cross-com-
plaint for separate maintenance which was amended at the 
trial by adding a prayer for divorce. Judgment granting a 
divorce on the cross-complaint, the complaint having been dis-
missed, affirmed. 
Jerrell Babb for Appellant. 
Roy J. Farr for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff filed an action for divorce on the 
ground of desertion against defendant to whom he had been 
married for over thirty years. Defendant answered and 
cross-complained for separate maintenance on the ground of 
extreme cruelty. Subsequently plaintiff filed an answer to 
defendant's cross-complaint and an amended complaint adding 
a second cause of action for divorce on the ground of defend-
ant's alleged extreme cruelty. At the trial defendant amended 
her cross-complaint by adding a prayer for divorce. Plainti:tI 
Aug. 1941.] KEENER v. KEENER. 
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dismissed his complaint and the action was tried on the cross-
complaint of defendant as a default. 
Defendant alleged in her cross-complaint as amended that 
during the last three years of her married life plaintiff on 
numeroUs occasions lost his temper and found fault with de-
fendant in the presence of friends and acted in a· peculiar 
manner, that he remarked in the presence of friends that de-
fendant was not a good or proper wife, that he told her she 
should get out and support herself, and that he requested her 
to apply for work as a kitchen cook or servant. She alleged 
that these acts caused her grievous mental anguish. 
At the trial defendant testified regarding the acts of the 
plaintiff substantially in accord with the allegations of the 
amended cross-complaint. She testified that this conduct was 
continuous, made her nervous and ill and caused her great 
:mental suffering. A corroborating witness testified that she 
heard the testimony of defendant, knew the facts therein re-
lated and corroborated them in their entirety. 
The court granted defendant a divorce upon her cross-
complaint and plaintiff appealed. 
[1] Plaintiff contends that the facts alleged and proved 
by defendant were insufficient to sustain an action for divorce 
on the ground of extreme cruelty. Section 94 of the Civil 
Code defines extreme cruelty as "the wrongful infliction of 
grievous bodily injury, or grievous mental suffering, upon the 
other by one party to the marriage." In each case the in-
fliction of "grievous mental suffering" is a question of fact 
to be deduced from the circumstances of the case, in the light 
. of the intelligence, refinement and delicacy of sentiment of 
the complaining party. (Barnes v. Barnes, 95 Cal. 171 [3·0 
Pac. 298, 16 L. R. A. 660] ; Fleming v. Fleming, 95 Cal. 430 
[30 Pac. 566, 29 Am. St. Rep. 124] ; MacDonald v. MacDon-
ald, 155 Cal. 665 [102 Pac. 927, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 45]; 
Avery v. Avery, 148 Cal. 239 [82 Pac. 967] ; Cline v. Cline, 4 
Cal. A'pp;(2d) 626 [41 Pac. (2d) 588]; Shaw v. Shaw, 122 
Cal. App. i 72 [9 Pac. (2d) 876] ; Davis v. Davis, 58 CaL App. 
100, 102 [207 Pac. 923] ; Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. 
App. 17, 22 [199 Pac. 885].) A corre·ct decision must depend 
. upon the sound sense and judgment of the trial court. (Barnes 
v. Barnes, supra; Shaw v. Shaw, supra.) Its conclusion will 
not be disturbed unless the evidence is so slight as to indicate 
an abuse 6f discretion. (MacDonald v. MacDonald, supra; 
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Davis v. Davis, supra; Andrews v. Andrews, 120 Cal. 184 [52 
Pac. 298J.) 
[2] A course of conduct by which one party to the mar-
riage continually indicates dissatisfaction with the other and 
makes such dissatisfaction known to friends of the parties 
may well cause humiliation, embarrassment and mental an-
guish to a degree constituting extreme cruelty. In the instant 
case plaintiff was a teacher in the public schools and his loss 
of temper and repeated criticisms of defendant in the presence 
of their friends and his statements, after more than 25 years 
of marriage, that she should support herself were sufficient to 
constitute extreme cruelty if they prove to have caused her 
grievous mental suffering. The trial judge was in a position 
to observe the intelligence, refinement and delicacy of senti-
ment of the defendant and to determine whether plaintiff's 
conduct caused her grievous mental suffering. In the ab-
sence of. an abuse of discretion, his conclusion cannot be dis-
turbed. 
[3] Plaintiff contends that the defendant did not suffi-
ciently allege or prove that his conduct was wrongful. . While 
section 94 by its definition of extreme cruelty requires. an 
element of wrongfulness, the pleader need not use the exact 
language of the statute. It is sufficient if the rational infer-
ence from the allegations of the cross-complaint is that the 
infliction of the suffering upon the other party was wrongful. 
(Nelson v. Nelson, 18 Cal. App. 602 [123 Pac; 1099];Mc-
Cahanv. McCahan, 47 Cal. App. 176, 180 [190 Pac. 460].) 
,[4] It was not necessary that defendant establish as part 
of her case her own freedom from fault where plaintiff in his 
answer to her cross-complaint did not allege any fault on her 
part and there was no evidence at the trial indicating that de-
fendant was in any way responsible for plaintiff's course of 
conduct. Plaintiff did not see fit to cross-examine defendant 
or to offer any evidence on his own behalf. 
[5] It was not necessary that defendant plead the exact 
time and place of each of plaintiff's acts, for the conduct of 
which she complained was continuous and not confined to any 
particular time or locality. (Zartarian v. Zartarian, 47 Cal. 
. App. 90 [190 Pac. 196].) Moreover, plaintiff did not see fit. 
to demur specially to the amended cross-complaint. [6] Nor 
was it necessary that defendant prove that plaintiff's course of 
conduct was inspired by malevolent motives. (Barngro'verv. 
Barngrover, 57 Cal. App. 43 [206 Pac. 451].) , 
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[7] Plaintiff contends that the corroboration offered by 
. defendant was inadequate. Where the cruelty consists of 
successive acts of ill-treatment, however, it is not necessary 
that there be direct testimony of other witnesses to every act 
sworn to by the complaining party. (Andrews v. Andrews, 
s'/,(,pra.) Here the corroborating witness stated that she heard 
the testimony of the defendant and knew the facts related 
therein to be true. No objection to this testimony was made 
by the, plaintiff. The corroboration was sufficient. 
[8] Plaintiff complains of the failure of the trial court to 
make :findings of fact. The parties joined in a written stipu-
lation, filed with the clerk, waiving findings. Under such 
circumstances findings are not required. (Code Civ, Pi-oc., 
sec. 632. See Waldecker v. Waldecker, 178 Cal. 566 [174 
Pac. 36].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Car-
ter, J., concurred. 
[Crim. No. 4343. In Bank.-Aug. 19, 1941.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. DEWEY CLARK et al., Ap-
pellants. 
[1] Homicide-Evidence-Evidence of Murder.-In a prosecution 
for murder the evidence justified a conviction where it showed 
the finding of the defendants a few hours after the disappear-
ance of the murdered couple in unexplained possession of the 
automobile in which they were last seen alive, where they 
were positively identified by a garageman who saw them after 
the. commission of the crime and whose testimony was cor-
roborated by others, where there was testimony of other wit-
nesses to defendants' presence near the scene of the crime 
on the evening thereof which was not inherently improbable, 
where. there were corroborating circumstances including blood 
on. defendants' clothing, and where contradictions in defend-
ants' testimony justified its rejection by the jury. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Homicide, § 145 (3); 2. Witnesses, 
§ 23. 
18 C. (2d)-15 
